Science for Sale
(Page 4 of 5)
November/December 1999
Tinker Ready Boston Phoenix (www.bostonphoenix.com)
Then, in December 1998, The Wall Street Journal pointed out both Selkoe's and Roses' links to Athena. A week later, an anonymous complaint charged Selkoe and another Harvard Alzheimer's researcher--John Growdon, who chaired the panel--with violating the university's conflict-of-interest rules.
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Selkoe offered a written statement saying he suggested disclosing his corporate affiliation, but Growdon had thought it unnecessary. 'However,' Selkoe wrote, 'it should be considered that my affiliation with Athena was already very widely known in the Alzheimer's disease field and was included in published articles in the past.'
Well, not always. Science magazine reported in 1992 that Selkoe routinely wrote about Alzheimer's without mentioning his corporate affiliation. And a random check of eight studies Selkoe authored and published in 1996 and 1997 found no mention of his relationship with Athena--a relationship that has paid off richly. When Athena went public in 1993, Selkoe owned 255,000 shares worth $3 million, according to Science. When Elan Corp PLC, an Irish biotech company, bought Athena in 1996, Selkoe had a $50,000-per-year consulting contract and sat on the company's board, according to Securities and Exchange Commission documents. He now sits on Elan's board of directors.
So who's minding the store? With so much money at stake, the scientific community has been unable to reach a consensus. Congress paved the way by passing a law in 1980 that made it easier for federally funded scientists to patent and profit from their findings; many became stockholders, board members, and consultants. The NIH, which dispenses $15 billion annually in research grants, tried cracking down in 1989 by asking researchers to report their corporate links when applying for funding, but angry respondents called the plan an attack on academic freedom.
Instead, the NIH asked universities to set their own rules. Unfortunately, the process remains secret, which defeats the purpose, says Mildred K. Cho, a professor at Stanford University's Center for Biomedical Ethics: 'The disclosure is not a true disclosure if it is not public,' she says.
Because schools collect a share of royalties, they have their own conflicts, she adds. These days, universities encourage 'technology transfer': research that is sold or licensed to private companies. MIT earned $21.2 million in royalties and from the sale of stock in startup companies in 1997--up from $10.2 million in 1996. Harvard filed 61 patent applications, signed 67 licensing agreements, and collected $16.5 million from existing licensing contracts in 1997, up from $7.6 million in 1996.
The Dennis Selkoe case is interesting because Harvard created a particularly strict conflict-of-interest policy in 1990, when it was still smarting from the case of a Massachusetts Eye and Ear Hospital doctor who tested a questionable eye drug on hundreds of patients. The drug turned out to be useless, but not before the doctor earned $1 million by selling stock in the manufacturer. So Harvard forbids faculty members to test their own companies' drugs. But publishing rules are vague: a faculty committee must grant researchers permission to present results without disclosing relevant financial interests.
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